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The Federal Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and En-
forcement (OSMRE) has struggled for years to flesh out the
regulatory framework under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977.' One of OSMRE's most debated un-
dertakings concerns the meaning of the clause "subject to valid
existing rights," contained in Section 522(e). 2 Attempts by
OSMRE to define the meaning and application of the valid
existing rights (VER) concept in the Act have prompted court
challenges resulting first in a judicial revision of the regulation
and, later, in an outright rejection of a new rule on procedural
grounds.' A third attempt resulted in a withdrawal of the pro-
posed rulemaking after public scrutiny and comment. 4 Despite
several scholarly articles,' a number of court decisions6 and
* B.A. 1968, Bowling Green University; J.D. 1971, University of Pittsburgh. Mr.
Shostak is a partner in Sowash, Carson & Shostak in Athens, Ohio, a partnership limited
to environmental litigation.
** B.A. 1970, Wesleyan University; J.D. 1979, West Virginia University. Mr.
Barrett is currently a partner with Distrapano & Jackson in Charleston.
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, §§
101-908, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988))[hereinafter cited as
SMCRA or the Act].
2 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
1 See 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988) (detailing the prior regulatory history of VER
and the ensuing litigation in the Discussion of Proposed Rules).
4 54 Fed. Reg. 30,557 (1989).
See e.g., McGinley and Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon Revis-
ited: Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an
Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 TuLsA L.J. 418 (1981); Barkeley and Albert, A Survey of
Case Law Interpreting: Valid Existing Rights "---Implications for Unpatented Mining
Claims, 34 ROCKY MTN. Min. L. IN sT. 9.1 (1988); McFerrin and Whitman, Valid Existing
Rights and the Constitution: 1983 Regulatory Changes, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 647 (1985);
Toffenetti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND AND WATER L. REV.
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administrative adjudications, 7 VER in the SMCRA context re-
mains amorphous'
This article will endeavor to advance the analysis of VER by
reviewing the legislative history of VER in statutes preceding
SMCRA and in SMCRA itself, by drawing from judicial, aca-
demic and advocacy writings, and of course by analyzing VER
in the context of the SMCRA.9 We believe the conclusions
derived from our analysis fulfill the intents and purposes of
Congress as expressed in the Act's delicate balance of the com-
peting and incompatible coal extraction industry interests and
environmental interests.' 0
31 (1985); Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawal: Defining "Valid Existing Rights,"
3 J. MIN. LAW & POL'Y 517 (1988).
6 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1083 (D. D.C. 1980), aff'd 653 F.2d 514, cert denied sub nom. Peabody Coal Co. v.
Watt, 454 U.S. 822 (1981); See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981), in which the Supreme Court concurred in the district court's
rejection of the strict VER "all permits test" but upheld the constitutionality of § 522
of SMCRA against a facial "takings" challenge. See also, Sunday Creek Coal Co. v.
Hodel, No. C-2-88-0416, slip op. (S.D. Ohio June 2, 1988); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v.
U.S., 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989) and earlier, 752 F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. 1557 (D. D.C. 1985); Ainzley v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 394 (1985); Otter Creek Coal Co., 231 Ct. Cl. 879 (1982); Otter
Creek Coal Co., 224 Ct. Cl. 697 (1980); Cogar v. Faerber, 371 S.E.2d 321 (W.Va.
1988); Willowbrook Mining Co. v. Commonwealth, 499 A.2d 2 (Pa. Com. Ct. 1985).
7 Valley Camp Coal Co. v. OSMRE, 112 IBLA 19 (1989); The Stearns Co., 110
IBLA 345 (1989); Blackmore Co., Hagan Estates Inc., 108 IBLA-(1989); Ruth Z.
Ainzley, 98 IBLA 306 (1987).
If one counts all the costs associated with the SMCRA VER controversy from
its 1977 birth to the present, including costs associated with administrative regulation,
court challenges, academic debates, citizens participation, industry defense and media
coverage, the ludicrousness of the controversy astounds even the hardest-core bureaucrat.
All of this may be a purely academic exercise if the applicable statute of limitations on
takings claims has expired. See note 160 and accompanying text, infra.
SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. 1272(e) addresses land and mineral rights ownership
in the National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge Systems, the National System
of Trails, the Nationa Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild and Scenic Rivers
System, National Recreaction Areas, National Forests, publicly-owned parks and inclu-
sions in the National Register of Historic Sites, public roads, occupied buildings, and
cemeteries. All of the 522(e) bans are subject to VER. S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 94 (1977). Any interpretation of VER must take into account that one of the
purposes of SMCRA is to assure that the nation's coal supply meets its energy demands.
SMCRA § 102(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(t) states:
(f) assure that the coal supply essential to the Nation's energy requirements,
and to its economic and social well-being is provided and strike a balance
between protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and
the Nation's need for coal as an essential source of energy ....
10 See, e.g., SMCRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988).
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I. LEGISLATIVE ORIGINS OF VER IN SMCRA
It is an axiom that Congress is aware of the meaning of and
interpretation of certain language when it uses such language in
enactments. II Thus when Congress used the phrase "subject to
valid existing rights" in Section 522, it may be presumed that
the phrase carried with it all the baggage it had accumulated in
nearly 100 years of prior enactments and court cases.
However, an examination of the circumstances of VER's
appearance in SMCRA reveals that Congress' 1977 idea of VER
may have been different from its traditional meaning.
1974 - S. 425 and H.R. 11500
In the legislative history of S. 425 and HR 11500, the first
real attempts by Congress to pass a mining law, the 93rd Con-
gress prohibited permit issuance on certain federal and non-
federal lands.
The Report of the House on H.R. 11500 states at Section
209, Permit Approval or Denial:
(d) No permit shall be issued by the regulatory authority unless
the permit application affirmatively demonstrates that, and the
regulatory authority makes specific written findings to the
effect that-
(3) the area proposed to be mined is not included within an
area designated unsuitable for surface coal mining pursuant to
section 206 of this Act or is not within an area under study
for such designation (unless in such an area under study, the
operator making the permit application demonstrates that, prior
to September 1, 1973, he has made substantial legal and fi-
nancial commitments in relation to the operation for which he
is applying for a permit);
(4) the land to be affected does not lie within three hundred
feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived by the owner
thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public building,
school, church, community, or institutional building, public
park, or cemetery; nor shall the land to be affected lie within
one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public
road, except that the regulatory authority may permit such
roads to be relocated, if the interests of the public and the
" See Note, supra note 5 at 544-45.
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landowners affected thereby will be protected;
(8) mining operations would not adversely affect nearby lands
and waters to which the public enjoys use and access, or the
mining of any area of land within one mile of publicly owned
lands or parks or places located in the National Register of
Historic Sites unless screening and other measure approved by
the regulatory authority are used and the permit so provides,
or if the mining of the area will not adversely affect or reduce
the usage of the publicly owned land;
(9) the mining operations are not located within any area of
the National Park System, the national forests, the National
Wildlife Refuge System, the National Wilderness Preservation
System, or the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, including study
rivers designated under section 5(a) of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act: Provided, however, That this paragraph shall not
prohibit surface mining operation in existence on the date of
enactment of this Act, or those for which substantial legal and
financial commitments were in existence prior to September 1,
1973; but, in no event shall such surface mining operations be
exempt from the requirements of this Act.
2
In its discussion of H.R. 11500, the 93rd Congress House of
Representatives acknowledged the per se prohibitions on mining
in the National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge Sys-
tem, the National Forests (except for National Grasslands) and
the Wild and Scenic Rivers System 13 and within 300 feet of
occupied dwellings and public buildings, and within 100 feet of
public roads 4 but did not advance any specific justification for
12 H.R. REP. No. 1072, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-12 (1974).
In 1972, the Pennsylvania law from which Congress apparently adopted Section
209(4) read:
From the effective date of this act, as amended hereby, no operator shall
open any pit for surface mining operations (other than borrow pits for
highway construction purposes) within one hundred feet of the outside line
of the right-of-way of any public highway or within three hundred feet of
any occupied dwelling house, unless released by the owner thereof, or any
public building, school, park, community or institutional building or within
one hundred feet of any cemetery or of the bank of any stream.
52 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1396.4.2(c) (1972). See also Dernbach, Pennsylvania's Imple-
mentation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How
"Cooperative Federalism" Can Make State Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19
MICH. J. OF L. REF. 903, 927 (1986).




the per se bans, 5 except as can be gleaned from the litany of
harmful effects associated with coal mining, set forth in the
House Report.
Interestingly, the Section 209(d) ban on Federal lands ex-
empted surface mining operations "in existence on the date of
enactment of this Act, or those for which substantial legal and
financial commitments were in existence prior to September 1,
1973; "but did not exempt such operations from the regulatory
requirements of this Act."11 6 No exception existed from the buf-
fer zone ban. Thus it appears that in H.R. 11500, the House
members of Congress intended to exempt from the ban on
mining Federal lands only existing operations or those operations
that had substantial legal and financial commitments prior to
enactment.
The 93rd Senate counterpart of H.R. 11500 was S. 425. Its
ban on surface mining operations in Section 216(c) exempted
only those in existence on the date of enactment:
(c) No surface mining operation except those which exist on
the date of enactment of this Act shall be permitted-
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the
National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge System,
the National System of Trails, the National Wilderness Pres-
ervation System, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and Na-
tional Recreation Areas designated by Act of Congress;
(2) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park
unless approved jointly by the regulatory authority and the
Federal, State, or local agency with jurisdiction over the park. 7
S. 425 did not ban mining within any buffer zones of houses,
buildings, roads and cemeteries. When the two chambers met in
conference, the meld of S. 425 and H.R. 11500 produced a new
Section 522(e) which incorporated Section 216(c) of S. 425 and
Sections 209(d)(3), (4), (8) and (9) of H.R. 11500 into previous
Section 206 of H.R. 11500. The new section numbered 522(e)
read:
"1 Id at 85. The Report states "[In the opinion of the Committee, the decision to
bar surface mining in certain circumstances is better made by Congress itself. Thus
Section 209 provides that permit applications must be denied for operations located
within certain publicly owned lands such as National Parks, national forests, wilderness
areas, and the corridors of wild and scenic rivers."
6 Id. at 12.
,7 S. REp. No. 402, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973).
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(c) Subject to valid existing rights to [sic] surface coal mining
operations except those which exist on the date of enactment
of this Act shall be permitted-
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the
National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge System,
the National System of Trails, the National Wilderness Pres-
ervation System, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, including
study rivers designated under section 5(a) of the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act and National Recreation Areas designated
by Act of Congress;
(2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any
national forest except surface operations and impacts incident
to an underground coal mine;
(3) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park or
places included in the National Register of Historic Sites unless
approved jointly by the regulatory authority and the Federal,
State, or local agency with jurisdiction over the park or the
historic site;
(4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way
line of any public road, except that the regulatory authority
may permit such roads to be relocated or the area affected to
lie within one hundred feet of such road, if after public notice
and opportunity for public hearing in the locality a written
finding is made that the interests of the public and the land-
owners affected thereby will be protected; or
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling,
unless waived by the owner thereof, nor within three hundred
feet of any public building, school, church, community, or
institutional building, public park, or within one hundred feet
of a cemetery.18
The pertinent differences between the 93rd Congress House
and Senate bills can be summarized as follows:
(1) whereas the original version of S. 425 provided no
protection of VER from the per se ban on new mining on
federal lands in Section 216(c), 19 H.R. 11500 provided that
existing surface coal mining operations on Federal lands or
those for which substantial legal and financial commitments
had been made were not per se banned20 or subject to unsuit-
H.R. REP. No. 1522, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 53-54 (1974).
" Section 217(e) provided for a 15 percent expansion on existing surface coal
mining operations on Federal lands. S. 425, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. § 217 (1974).
1 S. 425, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., § 209(d)(9) (1974).
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ability designation;2 and
(2) whereas H.R. 11500 had not provided any protection
of property rights impaired by the per se ban on surface mining
operations in the buffer zones around dwellings, buildings, and
public roads, 22 the conference bill subjected all per se banned
areas, Federal and private, to this new clause: "Subject to
valid existing rights."
The conference report on S. 425 defined the phrase "subject
to valid existing rights" only in terms of "strip mining on the
national forests" and an explanation that the provision was "not
intended to affect or abrogate any previous state court deci-
sions. The Conference Report on S. 425 cited U.S. v. Polino
24
1, Id. at §§ 209(d)(3) and 206(a)(6).
12 Id. at § 209(d)(4) (1974).
23 H.R. Rep. No. 1522, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 85 (1974).
The full text reads:
6. Valid Existing Rights.-The language "subject to valid existing rights"
in Section 522(e) is intended to make clear that the prohibition of strip
mining on the national forests is subject to previous state court interpre-
tation of valid existing rights. The language of 522(e) is in no way intended
to affect or abrogate any previous state court decisions. For example, in
West Virginia's Monongahela National Forest, strip mining of privately
owned coal underlying federally owned surface has been prohibited as a
result of U.S. v. Polino, 131 F.Supp. 772 (N.D. W.Va. 1955). In this case
the court held that "stripping was not authorized by mineral reservation
in a deed executed before the practice was adopted in the county where
the land lies, unless the contract expressly grants stripping rights by use of
direct or clearly equivalent words. The party claiming such rights must
show usage or custom at the time and practice where the contract is to be
executed and must who that such rights were contemplated by the parties."
The phrase "subject to valid existing rights" is thus in no way intended
to open up national forest lands to strip mining where previous legal
precedents have prohibited stripping.
Section 522 provides for the establishment of a process for designating
lands unsuitable for surface coal mining while title VI grants authority to
the Secretary to prohibit mining operations for minerals or materials other
than coal on Federal lands. Designation of an area of Federal lands in
Alaska under this provision or under title VI will not affect such land's
availability for selection by the State of Alaska under the Alaska Statehood
Act or by Alaska Natives under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.
, 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. W.Va. 1955). Congress clearly intends to protect VER
acquired in Federal lands in SMCRA just as it did so in other enactments preceding
SMCRA. That Congress was aware that coal rights which achieved VER status could
be acquired in a fashion different form a mining claim is underscored in its citation to
Polino. Thus, Congress said that traditional concept of VER, i.e. rights acquired against
the sovereign, was broad enough to include rights acquired through private contract.
The principles of fair play when toying with one's private property are evident. A
relatively simple concept-one who had acquired rights in Federal lands, whether by
tenancy under law or by purchase before it became Federal lands was nonetheless entitled
to protection of those rights from unfair action by the proprietor.
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as an example of a state case where VER was not found.
Unfortunately Congress did not discuss how it intended VER to
operate in property rights contexts excluding National Forests.
One logical conclusion which can be drawn, however, is that the
clause "subject to valid existing rights" which replaced the sub-
stantial legal and financial commitments language of H.R. 11500
and no protection in S. 425 represents a compromise position
between the two. We believe its scope encompasses something
more than substantial legal and financial commitments coupled
with a right to mine but falls just short of existing operations.
This view finds additional support in the overall structure of
Section 522. Although industry has argued that the replacement
VER clause now contained in 522(e) was intended to accomplish
the same purpose as the "substantial legal and financial com-
mitments" language included in the House version, 25 this does
not explain why Congress retained the substantial legal and
financial commitment language in 522(a)(6), but did not in 522(e).
It is more likely that Congress did not believe the terms to be
synonymous, 26 and intended to protect a much narrower class
of rights where it banned mining by legislative fiat than the class
of rights which may be impaired by an unsuitability designation
through administrative process.
S. 425 was pocket vetoed by President Ford on December
30, 1974.27
1975- S. 7 and H.R. 25
The 94th Congress acted promptly to try to enact a coal
mining law. The House reported H.R. 25 on March 6, 1975,
and the Senate reported S. 7 on March 5, 1975. Section 522(e)
remained essentially unchanged from S. 425 in both bills. Senate
Report 94-28 on S. 7 contained a new insight of the intent of
Congress in enacting the ban on surface coal mining operations
in the buffer zones set out in 522(e)(4) and (5). It states:
25 See e.g., In Re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1557 (1985). (Industry supported the "takings" based definition.)
16 But c.f., 30 CFR § 762.5 (1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,344 (1979) (This
formulation of "substantial legal and financial commitment" is more onerous than
industry would probably like.)
21 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 140, (1977). See Note, A Summary of
the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and
the Relevant Periodical Literature, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 775 (1979).
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[Flor reasons of public health and safety, surface coal mining
will not be allowed within one hundred feet of a public road
(except to provide access for a haul road), within 300 feet of
an occupied building or within 500 feet of an active under-
ground mine."128 (emphasis added)
This language made it quite clear that with respect to the
per se ban on mining within buffer zones contained in 522(e)(4)
and (5), Congress was acting to protect the public health and
safety from a "noxious use of the land." Senate Report 94-28
also adopted in essence the VER explanation contained in the
report on S. 425.29
H.R. 25 and S. 7 went to conference and then were reported
out of conference on May 2, 1975.30 House Report 94-189 on
the conference bill (H.R. 25) reported Section 522(e) verbatim
from the 93rd Congress conference bill (S. 425) and reiterated
the 93rd Congress' definition of valid existing rights.3 1 H.R. 25
was vetoed by President Ford on May 20, 1975.32
1976-77 - S. 7 and H.R. 2
The election of a democratic administration set the stage for
SMCRA. H.R. 2 was reported out of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs on April 22, 1977. Section 522(e) of
H.R. 2 was unchanged except for Subsection (2), which required
the Secretary to determine whether any significant recreational,
timber, economic or other values existed which would be incom-
patible with surface operations and impacts incident to an un-
derground mine or whether, on western lands, the forest cover
is not significant.33
On May 9, 1977, the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources reported out S. 7. Section 422(e) of S. 7
1, S. REP. No. 28, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1975).
29 See note 23, supra and accompanying text.
30 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977, U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN NEws 593.
H.R. REP. No. 189, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1975).
32 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 141 (1977). The 94th Congress House
reported two additional bills after H.R. 25. See H.R. REP. No. 896 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976). On August 31, 1976, H.R. 13950 was reported out. It carried the same VER
language as 522(e) and its explanation of what VER means.
33 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 44 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 593.
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matched nearly verbatim with Section 522(e) of H.R. 2, including
the rewrite of Subsection (2).1
4
Both bills passed their respective Houses and went to
conference. The Conference Bill (H.R. 2) retained the House
version of 522(e).11
The House Report on H.R. 2 reiterated that in 522(e),
"the decision to bar surface mining in certain circumstances is
better made by Congress itself. Thus Section 522(e) provides
that, subject to valid existing rights no surface coal mining
operation except those in existence on the date of enactment
shall be permitted on lands within the boundaries of units of
certain Federal systems ...or in other special circumstances,
that is within 100 feet of public roads, 300 feet of public
buildings or churches, or 100 feet of a cemetery." 36
See, S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1977).
See, S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-72, (1977).
, H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 593, 631. The full text reads:
Although the designation process will serve to limit mining where such
acitivity is inconsistent with rational planning in the opinion of the com-
mittee, the decision to bar surface mining in certain circumstances is better
made by Congress itself. Thus Section 522(e) provides that, subject to valid
existing rights, no surface coal mining operation except those in existence
on the date of enactment, shall be permitted on lands within the boundaries
of units of certain Federal systems such as the national park system and
national wildlife refuge system, on Federal lands within the boundaries of
any national forest (except in those circumstances set forth in Sec. 522(c)
of the committee amendment) or in other special circumstances, that is
within 100 feet of public roads, 300 feet of public buildings or churches,
or 100 feet of a cemetery.
As subsection 522(e) prohibits surface coal mining on lands within the
boundaries of national forests, subject to valid existing rights, it is not the
intent, nor is it the effect of this provision to preclude surface coal mining
on private inholdings within the national forests. The language "subject to
valid existing rights" in section 522(e) is intended, however, to make clear
that the prohibition of strip mining on the national forests is subject to
previous court inperpretations of valid existing rights. For example, in
West Virginia's Monongahela National Forest, strip mining of privately
owned coal underlying federally owned surface has been prohibited as a
result of United States v. Polino, [133] F.Supp. 722 [(N.D. W.Va. 1955)].
In that case the court held that "stripping was not authorized by mineral
reservation in a deed executed before the practice was adopted in the
county where the land lies, unless the contract expressly grants stripping
rights by use of direct or clearly equivalent words. The party claiming such
rights must show usage or custom at the time where the contract is to be
executed and must show that such rights were contemplated by the parties."
The phrase "subject to existing rights" is thus in no way intended to open
[VOL. 5:585
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Once again, the House Committee defined VER only in
relation to national forests, citing U.S. v. Polino3 7 as an example
of how VER was intended to operate in 522(e).
The Senate Committee, on the other hand, specifically stated
again that the 522(e)(4) and (5) buffer zone bans in S. 7 are
enacted "for reasons of public health and safety. ' 3 8 In its sec-
tion-by-section analysis of S. 7, the Senate Committee specifies
that all the Subsection (e) bans are subject to valid existing
rights. The House and Senate Reports, however, explain VER
in the context of national forests only. 9 The Conference Report
on H.R. 2 does not shed further light on 522(e). 40
A review of floor debates provides a bit of insight into
congressional intent regarding the purpose of the VER clause.
During an exchange on the House floor on an amendment
proposed by Representative Roncalio of Wyoming, Representa-
tive Udall, SMCRA's chief architect, remarked that a similar
VER phrase contained in Section 601 of the bill was intended
to preserve valid legal rights and its removal may require pay-
ment of compensation.4'
up national forest lands to strip mining where previous legal precedents
have prohibited stripping.
This discussion, however, can be read to suggest that Congress intended to allow
mining on private inholdings and on public lands in which court- or agency-defined
VER exists. More likely, Congress intended simply to preserve these rights from extin-
guishment, rather than to exempt VER interest from the prohibitions.
31 131 F.Supp. 772 (N.D. W.Va 1955).
38 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977). Again, however, the Senate
Committee carried the language from 94-28 that surface owner property rights under
state laws must be preserved and no provision of S. 7 was intended to change such
rights. Id. at 56.
39 See, S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th
Cong. Ist Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 593.
S. REP. No. 337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at Ill (1977).
See, 123 CoNo. REC. H12,878 (1977) (remarks of Mr. Roncalio), cited in
Meridian Land and Mineral Company v. Hodel, 843 F.2d 340, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1988).
The following exchange between Mr. Roncalio and Mr. Udall, the Bill's principal sponsor
indicates Udall's insistence on including a VER clause in SMCRA:
MR. RONCALIO:
There are those who may be reluctant to approve my amendment saying
that this would amount to a "taking" and that the Government would in
turn be liable for reimbursement and other associated costs. I would hope
tha the Secretary might facilitate an exchange whereby a location of similar
mineral value might be received for whatever claim is to be withdrawn or
if that may not be feasible, it very well may be in the public interest to
negotiate payment. Each situation can and should be reviewed in total and
1989-901
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Udall's remark implies that he was mindful of Holmes' view
in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon42 that if a regulation went "too
far", it may constitute a taking and require invalidation or
payment of compensation. In 1977, Congress did not have the
benefit of the Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De-
Benedictis43 or Preseault v. ICC4 decisions which together sup-
port the proposition that under its commerce clause police power,
Congress may regulate to the point of prohibition a local nui-
sance-like activity for the protection of broad economic, social
and environmental goals.
The foregoing synopsis of the legislative history of VER in
SMCRA reveals that from the beginning Congress intended to
ban outright any new surface mining operation on, and impacts
from underground mining in the lands identified in 522(e)(1)-
(e)(5). 4s Further, Congress intended that all the 522(e) bans were
subject to VER but gave guidance about how VER was to be
construed only in regard to private mining rights in national
forest lands.
II. THE HISTORICAL USE OF THE VER TERM
The term "valid existing rights", or variants thereof, have
long been employed in connection with the disposition of public
lands. For example, acts relating to Indian reservations from the
late nineteenth century used the term, 46 as did subsequent exec-
utive orders.4 7 By the middle of the twentieth century, the term
on its own merits.
I urge adoption of the amendment.
MR. UDALL: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
MR. RONCALIO: I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.
MR. UDALL: Mr. Chairman, I would have to oppose the amendment,
because it takes from the bill a statement that valid legal rights should be
preserved. I do not think we should do that without paying compensation
under the fifth amendment.
,2 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
" - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 914 (1990).
" SMCRA § 510, 30 U.S.C. § 1250(b)(4) (1988) provides that no permit can be
issued if any 522 lands are included in the application.
E.g. the Missions Indians Relief Act, Act of Jan. 12, 1891, c.65, § 2, 26 Stat.
712 (uncodified) preserved "existing valid rights" from the operation of the reservation;
quoted in Pechanga Band of Mission Indians v. Kacor Realty, 680 F.2d 71, 72 (9th Cir.
1982).
" E.g., Exec. Order No. 1538, Mar. 28, 1912.
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was relatively common in legislation relating to national parks.
4 8
The VER term appeared in a 1924 Executive Order with-
drawing all islands off the coast of or in the coastal waters of
Florida, 49 and was construed in the following year in an oft-
cited opinion, Williams v. Brenning.5° That case construed VER
to include preference rights earned, but not awarded, prior to
the withdrawal. The agency described the purpose of the term
as follows:
But the withdrawal here in question saved any "valid existing
rights in and to" the lands so withdrawn, and a preferred right
which had been earned, though not actually awarded, prior to
the withdrawal is entitled to protection. The withdrawal was
designed to prevent initiation of new claims and not the de-
struction of rights theretofore fairly earned.5"
In a 1935 Opinion regarding an Executive Order withdrawing
public lands from settlement, location, sale, or entry pursuant
to the Taylor Grazing Act5 2 "subject to existing valid rights,"
the Solicitor noted that the term was "not a new expression"
and adopted the view espoused in Williams." Interestingly, the
opinion concluded that the term should be construed broadly in
the context of that Order because "the public interest in partic-
ular tracts of land within the confines of the broad expanse thus
withdrawn is too inconsequential to justify striking down the
individual rights through technical construction or harsh appli-
cation of the protective provisions of the order."
5 4
In the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,"1 Congress also provided
a variant of the "valid existing rights" language in order to
" Act of Sept. 14, 1950, ch. 950, § 1, 64 Stat. 849 (codified as 16 U.S.C. § 406d-
1 (1988))(Grand Teton); Act of July 26, 1950, ch. 492, § 2, 64 Stat. 377 (codified as 16
U.S.C. § 403k-i (1988))(Shenadoah and Smoky Mountains); Act of Mar. 4, 1940, ch.
40, § 2, 54 Stat. 41 (codified as 16 U.S.C. § 80)(General Grant and Kings Canyon); Act
of July 9, 1937, ch. 469, §§ 1, 2, 50 Stat. 485 (codified as 16 U.S.C. § 47(e)(1988))(Sequoia
and Yosemite); Act of May 5, 1926, ch. 241, § 1, 44 Stat. 397 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §
405 (1988))(Coos County, Or.).
49 Exec. Order No. 4109, Dec. 8, 1924.
- 51 I.D. 225 (1925).
1 Id. at 226.
11 Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315 et
seq.(1988)).
1 Opinion, February 8, 1935, 55 I.D. 205, 210 (interpreting Exec. Order No. 6910,
Nov. 26, 1934).
5" Id. at 210-211.
11 Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 192 (1988)).
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protect those who had invested their money and efforts in pros-
pecting for minerals in reliance upon Congress' invitation ex-
pressed in the 1872 Mining Law.56 Sensitive to the concerns
expressed in the Constitution that one's property should not be
unjustly impaired each time Congress withdrew federal lands
from exploration for valuable minerals or changed its policy
regarding mineral exploitation,57 Congress created exceptions or
protections for pre-existing claims and rights.
More recently, the Wilderness Act of 1964,58 the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act,59 and the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976,60 and other legislation affecting mining claims
6'
have included provisions which are "subject to valid existing
rights."
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA), passed
in 1971,62 was another productive source of VER interpretation.
That legislation, and Public Land Order 4582 which preceeded
it, withdrew certain public lands from entry in order to make
them available for selection and conveyance to the Eskimo Aleut
and certain Alaskan native groups in settlement of their claims.
63
These withdrawals were "subject to valid existing rights." 64 In
the various interpretive opinions that followed, the department
relied on earlier VER precedents in holding that the language
protected such interests as prior valid entries, 65 preference rights, 66
16 General Mining Law of 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (current codification at 30 U.S.C. §§
22-54 (1988)).
17 See, Barkeley and Albert, supra note 5.
11 Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988)).
See also Toffenetti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 20 LAND AND WATER
L. REV. 31 (1985); Note, Regulation and Land Withdrawals; Defining 'Valid Existing
Rights', 3 J. MtN. L. POL'Y 517 (1988).
51 Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1387 (1988)).
11 Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat 2744 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et.seq., §§
1716, 1781 (f), and 1783 (1988)).
61 See, e.g., Whiskeytown-Shasta-Trinity National Recreation Area, Pub.L. No.
89-336, § 1, 79 Stat. 1295 (1965) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460 q (1988)); Oregon Dunes
National Recreation Area, Pub. L. No. 92-160, §1, 86 Stat. 99 (1972) (codified at 16
U.S.C. 460z (1988)); Sawtooth National Recreation Area, Pub. L. No. 92-400, 86 Stat.
612 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460aa (1988)); Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area, Pub. L. No. 92-593, 86 Stat. 1311 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460 dd (1988)).
See also Mining in the Parks Act, Pub. L.No. 94-429, 90 Stat. 1342 (1976) (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988)) ("valid existing mining rights").
62 Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (1988)).
63 Id.
ANSCA §§ I1, 14, 16, 19(a), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1613, 1615, 1618 (1988).
65 Jack Z. Boyd (On Reconsideration) 15 IBLA 74, 81 I.D. 150 (1974).
6 Louis J. Hobbs, A-3501, 77 I.D. 5 (1970).
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and options to purchase under open entry leases. 67 A 1977 Sec-
retarial Order held that this language protected rights preserved




The common thread which runs through the legislation con-
taining VER protections and through the case law is the concept
of fairness69 in the sense that the government as proprietor
should not take advantage of its essentially powerless tenant.
70
The federal government, owner of the land upon or in which
mining rights are acquired, is not permitted to extinguish the
mineral rights holder's equity (read VER) in the federal land in
an unfair fashion. 7' Thus we find language describing the rela-
tionship between the government and a mineral prospector 72 such
as:
Indeed, this court is of the opinion that the subject extension
applications give the applicants valid existing rights where, as
here, they have met statutory and regulatory requirements and
have expended substantial time and money to develop their
prospecting permits. It would be unfair to encourage private
development of coal on federal lands, with the attendant ex-
penditures, without giving the applicant a fair opportunity to
capitalize on his investment.
73
Statutorily created mining rights have also been interpreted by
the courts as resting on equitable estoppel principles, 74 i.e. one
67 In re Miller, 3 ANCAB 238, 86 I.D. 285 (1979).
" Secretarial Order No. 3016, 85 I.D. 1, (1977).
69 See, e.g., Noyes v. Mantle, 12 U.S. 348, 351 (1888) (a prospector acquires a
beneficial interest in lands held by the U.S. in trust). Equity requires no less. See, Note,
supra note 58, at 538.
70 Compliance with statutory requirements is a prerequisite to protect against
divestiture because of the superior title of the U.S. See Note, supra note 58, at 527.
71 Id.
72 Peterson v. Department of Interior, 510 F.Supp. 777, 783 (D. Utah 1981).
71 See Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48, 52 (1970) (noting "judicial attitude
of fair treatment for claimants who have substantially completed the assessment work
required by 30 U.S.C. § 28); Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U.S. 348 (1888); The Yosemite Valley
Case, 82 U.S. 77 (1872); Opinion of the Attorney General, 25 I.D. 48 (1897); Peterson
v. Dept. of Interior, 510 F. Supp. 777 (D.C. Utah 1981); Williams v. Brening, 51 I.D.
225 (1925). See also Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Assn. v. Andrus, 500 F.Supp. 1338,
1345 (D.C. Wis. 1980) (A lease without developmental rights constitutes the destruction
of a valid existing right which is "blatantly unfair to lessees.")
U, See Benson Mining & Smelting Co. v. Alta Mining & Smelting Co., 145 U.S.
428, 430 (1892); Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U.S. 348 (1888); The Yosemite Valley Case, 82
U.S. 77 (1872).
1989-90]
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
"who has in good faith relied on and complied with the statute
by 'doing all he could do' should not be deprived of those
rights.' ,75
The principle that pre-existing unpatented mining claims be-
came valid existing rights enjoying a status as "property in the
fullest sense of that term" traces some of its roots to the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Benson Mining and Smelting Co. v.
Alta Mining and Smelting Co.,76 which created the doctrine of
"equitable title" in public lands. 77
Recently, the Supreme Court has described mining claims as
a "unique form of property" accorded the protections available
to traditional vested property rights, but subject nonetheless to
the police power with regard to their use.
78
Even with respect to vested property rights, a legislature gen-
erally has the power to impose new regulatory constraints on
the way those rights are used, or to condition their continued
retention on performance of certain affirmative duties. As long
as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction
designed to further legitimate legislative objectives, the legis-
lature acts within its powers in imposing such new constraints
or duties ....
This power to qualify existing property rights is particularly
broad with respect to the "character" of property rights at
issue here. Although owners of unpatented mining claims hold
fully recognized possessory interests in their claims ... we
have recognized these interests are a "unique form of prop-
erty." The United States, as owner of the underlying fee title
to the public domain, maintains broad powers over the terms
and conditions upon which the public lands can be used, leased
or acquired.
79
Throughout these various interpretations, the precise mean-
ing of VER has defied definition, and the circumstances of each
'5 See note, supra note 58, at 528; Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295
U.S. 639 (1935) held that when Congress changed the prior method of exploiting minerals
on public lands under the Mineral Leasing Act subject to "valid claims existent on date
of the passage of this Act," Congress intended to not void a claim which failed to
comply with the new requirement. See discussion in Note, supra note 55, at 535.
16 145 U.S. 428 (1892).
11 Id. at 430. See also Barkeley and Albert, supra note 5, at 9-14.
71 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 (1985).
79 Id. at 104 (citations omitted). See also, Barkeley and Albert, supra note 5, at
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case have been considered in reference to the purpose and lan-
guage of the underlying statute in applying the provision. For
the most part, however, the historical approach of the executive
to the various VER issues arising under these statutes and leg-
islative orders has been a proprietary one between the govern-
ment and the claimant of VER: i.e., do the interests in question,
though short of full legal or equitable title, rise to a level that
it would be unfair to extinguish or withhold what the claimant
earned or bargained for or, as in the case of ANSCA, to convey
the property to someone else?
This analysis, however, would seem on its face inappropriate
to SMCRA in two respects. One area of apparent incongruity is
that when VER has been used in these various public lands
programs, it generally describes the relationship between the
individual VER claimant who asserts an interest and the sover-
eign who owns fee title to the land. In this context, if a private
person actually holds title by conveyance to the mineral rights
the question of VER usually does not arise, because the sovereign
is not in the position to assert its own conflicting proprietary
interest in the property. For example, in a 1979 opinion regard-
ing the Bureau of Land Management's wilderness review and
valid existing rights,80 the Solicitor stated that "'valid existing
rights' are those rights short of vested rights that are immune
from denial or extinguishment by the exercise of secretarial
discretion."'" While this definition may not be entirely satisfac-
80 Solicitor's Opinion M-36910 (Supp.), 88 1.D. 909, 912 (1981), modifying 86 I.D.
89 (1979).
81 The discussion was as follows:
Although the legislative history is largely silent on the scope of this term,
it is not unique to FLPMA. The term has an extensive history both in the
Department and the courts.
In defining "valid existing rights," the Department distinguished three
terms: "vested rights," "valid existing rights," and "applications" or
"proposals." "Valid existing rights" are distinguished from "applications'
because such rights are independent of any secretarial discretion. They are
Property interests rather than mere expectancies. Compare Shraier v. Hickel,
419 F.2d 663, 666-67 (D.C. Cir 1969) and George J. Propp, 56 I.D. 347,
351 (1938) with Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 20 (1965), United States ex
rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 420 (1931), and Albert A. Howe,
26 IBLA 386, 387 (1976). "Valid existing rights" are distinguished from
"vested rights" by degree: they become vested rights when all of the
statutory requirements required to pass equitable or legal title have been
satisfied. Compare Stockley v. United States, 260 U.S. 532, 544 (1923)
with Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1921) and Wirth v.
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tory depending on the governmental action in question and how
one defines "vested rights, ' 82 it illustrates the point that VER
historically has been a device employed to resolve apparent
conflict between the government and the legitimate interests of
private individuals who hold less than fee interests in public
lands to which the government holds title. The applicability of
traditional VER analysis to non-public lands in Section 522(e)(4)
and (5) of SMCRA, therefore, on its face seems suspect.
Pre-SMCRA VER analyses also have tended to focus on the
question of property rights, acquired from the government as
owner of the fee, in a traditional proprietary sense, evaluating
interests earned or acquired from the government as a form of
Branson, 98 U.S. 118, 121 (1878). Thus "valid existing rights" are those
rights short of vested rights that are immune from denial or extinguishment
by the exercises of secretarial discretion.
Valid existing rights may arise in two situations. First, a statute may
prescribe a series of requirements which, if satisfied, create rights in the
claimant's actions under the statute without an intervening discretionary
act. The most obvious example is the 1872 Mining Law: a claimant who
has made a discovery and properly located a claim has a valid existing
right by his actions under the statute; the Sectetary has no discretion in
processing any subsequent patent application. Second, a valid existing right
may be created as a result of the exercise of secretarial discretion. For
example, although the Secretary is not required to approve an application
for a right-of-way, if an application is approved the applicant has a valid
existing right to the extent of the rights granted. Similarly, the Secretary
has discretion to approve, deny, or suspend an application for an oil and
gas lease. Once the lease is issued however, the applicant has valid existing
rights in the lease.
Valid existing rights are not, however, absolute. The nature and extent of
the rights are defined either by the statute creating the rights or by the
manner in which the Secretary chose to exercise his discretion. Thus, it is
not possible to identify in the abstract every interest that is a valid existing
right; the question turns upon the interpretation of the applicable statute
and the nature of the rights conveyed by approval of an application.
Because of the importance of the individual approval and its stipulations,
a review of each approval document will be required to determine the
precise scope of an applicant's valid existing rights where such rights are
created by an act of secretarial discretion.
Id. at 911-12 (footnotes and citations omitted).
A much more comprehensive analysis of the various types of protectable private interest
in public lands, including those recognized as "valid existing rights," appears in Laitos
and Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11
HARv. ENv-T'L L. REV. 1 (1987). This article identifies six classes of property interests:
(1) vested rights, (2) non vested rights, (3) protected possessory interests, (4) non
discretionary entitlements, (5) rights of possession, and (6) applications. Id. at 9-18.
11 For example, in Natural Resource Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553
(D.C Cir. 1969) a preference right coal lease was held to be a "vested right" to a lease
entitled to protection under a VER clause.
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"real property," 3 which the "subject to valid existing rights"
language seeks to protect from subsequent competing proprietary
activity on the part of the government. When VER-protective
language appears in legislation designed to curtail the adverse
effects of the claimant's activity however, these prior precedents
seem less instructive.
Despite these inconsistencies, it is nevertheless quite possible
to find a theme in the use and interpretation of VER clauses
prior to the passage of SMCRA. This theme was summarized in
a recent ANSCA case:
We conclude that "valid existing rights" does not necessarily
mean vested rights .... The term "valid existing rights" does
not necessarily mean present possessory rights, or even a future
interest in the property law sense of existing ownership that
becomes possessionary upon the expiration of earlier estates.
Legitimate expectations may be recognized as valid existing
rights, especially where the expectancy is created by govern-
ment in the first place .... A government is most responsible
when it recognizes a right that which (sic) is not strictly en-
forceable but which flows nevertheless from the government's
own prior representations.1
4
Valid existing rights, in the broadest sense, historically flow from
government-induced expectations. And it is these expectations
that arguably are protected by SMCRA's VER clause.
In order to understand these expectations in the context of
mineral lands, however, it is necessary to understand the interests
involved. These interests undoubtedly embrace the reliance and
"sweat equity" of the mining entrepreneur, but they also em-
brace fully the notion that government has always retained the
right to regulate activity in the public interest. While the courts
have not allowed the federal government as proprietor to un-
fairly extinguish VER (once established), exploitation of VER is
nonetheless subject to regulation under the police power. 85
81 E.g., Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316 (1930).
Aleknagik Natives, Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924, 926-927 (9th Cir. 1986).
85 U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). But see Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Assn.
v. Andrus, 500 F.Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), reversed on other grounds, 696 F.2d 734
(10th Cir. 1982), where the court held that the grant of a leases grandfathered under
the FLPMA included a right of development at pre-FLPMA levels, but that environ-
mental concerns (FLPMA wilderness nondegredation policy) would be applied to future
leasing activity and development. Id. at 749. See also Solicitor's Opinion, 86 I.D. 89
(1979).
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III. Is 522(E) A REGULATORY TAKING?
Recent Supreme Court cases have provided some comfort to
those who have looked to SMCRA for relief against the ravages
of surface mining. The 1981 case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.86 and, more recently,
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictiss7 have
relieved concerns that statutory prohibitions of surface mining
or surface effects of underground coal mining will be held fa-
cially invalid as contrary to the dictates of Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon,85 in which Justice Holmes declared "to make it com-
mercially impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating it. '89
While these decisions put to rest industry's contention that such
statutory limitations on mining, including Section 522(e) of
SMCRA, by their very enactment went "too far,'"'9 each left a
wake of uncertainty about future challenges.
The Hodel discussion of takings was terse. The Court, over-
turning a district court determination that the performance stan-
dards on steep slope mining and the Section 522 prohibitions in
SMCRA constituted unconstitutional takings, emphasized that
the takings analysis focuses on "ad hoc, factual inquiries,"
which must be "conducted with respect to specific property and
the particular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valu-
ation relevant in unique circumstances. "91 It held, simply, that
because the statute did not, on its face, prevent all beneficial
use of coal bearing lands and because the industry plaintiffs had
failed to avail themselves of opportunities for administrative
relief, there was no basis for declaring the act an unconstitutional
"taking." The court addressed Section 522(e) in a footnote,
describing the challenge as "premature" -first, because plain-
tiffs had failed to show they were actually affected; second,
86 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), decided as a
companion case, also addressed issues regarding the constitutionality of certain provisions
of SMCRA. Insofar as the issue of takings under the Fifth Amendment is concerned,
the decisions are essentially the same and are treated together for purposes of this
discussion.
-1 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
8s 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
s9 Id. at 414-415.
10 Id. at 415. ("The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
9, Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295.
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because the act on its face did not proscribe economically viable
non-mining uses; and third, because "[Section] 522(e)'s restric-
tions are expressly made subject to 'valid existing rights'.
92
The absence in Hodel of any serious confrontation with
Pennsylvania Coal left open to discussion among litigants and
scholars the vitality of the takings issue in the field of mining
regulation. It was not until 1987 when the Keystone decision was
issued that the theoretical bulwark of Pennsylvania Coal was
examined by the Supreme Court. Keystone concerned the con-
stitutionality of Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
Land Conservation Act, 93 which prohibited mining that causes
subsidence damage to public buildings and noncommercial build-
ings generally used by the public, dwellings used for human
habitation, and cemeteries. Pennsylvania's Department of En-
vironmental Resources had enforced the provision by regulations
requiring operators to leave 50% support under such structures,
and it was stipulated that this would prevent the removal of 27
million tons of coal in the plaintiff's various operations through-
out the state. On its face, industry contended, the act ran directly
afoul of Pennsylvania Coal, which some sixty-five years earlier
had invalidated Pennsylvania's Kohler Act prohibiting the min-
ing of anthracite coal in a manner that would cause subsidence
of land where certain structures existed.
The majority opinion in Keystone distinguished Pennsylvania
Coal on the basis that the Kohler Act, as viewed by Justice
Holmes, served only private interests rather than interests in
public health and safety protected by the police power and made
it commercially impracticable to mine coal; 94 by contrast, the
court held, the Subsidence Act under consideration was designed
to serve important public interests 95 and did not, at least on its
face, make it commercially impractical to mine.9 The Court
honored Pennsylvania Coal as having heralded its modern tak-
ings analysis, which it proceeded to apply to the industry chal-
lenge.
9I Id. at 296 n.37.
93 Pa. Stat. Ann. 717. 52, § 1406 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
" Although the majority opinion in Keystone is compelling in its emphasis on the
Subsidence Act's protection of public health and safety, and in particular in its nuisance-
likle activity, an examiniantion of Chief Justice Rehnquists's dissent reveals that some
of these public concerns were, in fact, asserted as a basis for the Kohler Act. See Id. at
506.
9 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 486.
Id. at 492.
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The Court in Keystone began by stressing the "critical"
importance of the "nature of the State's action," and its his-
torical "hesitance to find a taking when that state merely re-
strains uses of property that are tantamount to public
nuisances. . .. -97 Indeed, the Court suggested, this factor alone
might have provided an independent basis for rejecting the state's
challenge.
[T]he public interest in preventing activities similar to public
nuisances is a substantial one, which in many instances has
not required compensation. The Subsidence Act, unlike the
Kohler Act, plainly seeks to further such an interest. Nonethe-
less, we need not rest our decision on this factor alone .... 98
Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking bluntly in his dissent, char-
acterized this view as a 'nuisance exception' to takings analy-
sis."9
Proceeding to the more current analysis of "Diminution of
Value and Investment Backed Expectations"'00 the Court em-
phasized the "importance of a distinction between the claim that
the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and the
claim that a particular impact of governmental action on a
specific piece of property requires the payment of just compen-
sation. 01 Pointing to the "ad hoc, factual inquiries" required
by Hodel, the Court concluded that the heavy burden of sus-
taining a facial attack on the Act had not been met.
The Court then undertook an approach to diminution of
value which may be instructive in future mining cases by ad-
dressing the question of defining "the unit of property whose
value is to 'furnish the denominator for the fraction'."' 0 2
Recent court precedents have commented that, ordinarily,
property consists of a "bundle of rights," and "that the destruc-
tion of one strand of the 'bundle"' -however valuable-"is not
a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.'
0 3
91 Id. at 491.
" Id. at 492.
" Id. at 512.
1w See generally, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
'01 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 494.
,02 Id. at 497, quoting Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1192
(1967).
03 480 U.S. at 497; quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, at 130-31.
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This principle, of course, begs the question of what is the
"entirety" of the property, and on this latter issue the Court
was less definitive. In the case before it, the Court had little
problem rejecting industry's argument that the 27 million tons
of coal left in place by operation of the Subsidence Act defined
the unit taken. Rather the Court likened the limitation to set-
back ordinances and other zoning restrictions limiting use of
certain areas of one's property, the validity of which have long
been recognized, and concluded that this coal, amounting to less
than two percent of petitioner's property, did not constitute a
"separate segment of property for takings law purposes".'0
Justice Stevens' opinion for the majority in Keystone thus
resolved the issue in the negative without really saying what the
applicable unit of property is. This aspect of the opinion drew
a strong dissent from Chief Justice Rehnquist who posed the
more troubling issue peculiar to subsurface interests where the
'bundle' of rights is sparse"-and the prohibition or regulation
of mining "extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an iden-
tifiable segment of property." 105
Chief Justice Rehnquist's criticism, in the context of the
Subsidence Act, is not compelling. As the majority noted:
When the coal that must remain in the ground is viewed in
the context of any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining
operations and financial backed expectations, it is plain that
the petitioners have not come close to satisfying their burden
of proving that they have been denied the economically viable
use of that property.' °6
It may be argued, however, that the majority's failure to
resolve the single-use property issue leaves the question open for
successfully challenging applications of SMCRA that result in
complete denials of the right to mine an entire tract where only
mineral rights are held. 107 According to the analyses in Hodel
and Keystone, however, it is more likely that the Court intended
,o 480 U.S. at 498.
I d at 517. The dissent quotes Pennsylvania Coal for the proposition that for
practical purposes, the right to coal consists of the right to mine it.
11 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 499.
,07 This issue is considered at length in McGinley and Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon Revisited: Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of
the Police Power or an Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 TULSA L.J. 418, 438-442 (1981).
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this issue to be among the many factors considered in "ad hoc,
factual inquiries" that the takings analysis embraces.
This need not necessarily cause panic among environmental-
ists. Considering the Court's historical "hesitance," if not out-
right refusal, to find takings where "activities akin to a nuisance"
are prohibited under the police power, the single use property
"taking" is illusory in any event where the prohibition is cal-
culated to prevent a nuisance-like activity. The right to use one's
property to create a nuisance or to harm others is simply not
part of anyone's "bundle of rights."'°8 Accordingly, if the would-
be operator owns only minerals, any exploitation of which would
result in a nuisance or harm to others, nothing is "taken" by
the government's prohibition of mining notwithstanding appar-
ent destruction of any economically viable use of the property.,09
Further, the limited scope of the various 522(e) prohibitions on
most mining operations" ° will result in most challenges based
on diminution of value and investment-backed expectations fall-
ing short of the mark.
The more troubling spectre is that the availability of a po-
tential takings challenge may cause regulatory agencies charged
with the administration of SMCRA or a state program there-
under to be less aggressive, or at least inconsistent, in enforcing
statutory prohibitions. Some relief from this concern appears in
a related line of authority addressing the remedy available when
a taking is proven. In Hodel, for example, the Court commented
in a footnote that operators were free to show that their partic-
ular parcels of land were taken by the subject regulation, but
added: "Even then, such an alleged taking is not unconstitu-
tional unless just compensation is unavailable"."'
More recently, in Preseault v. ICC,112 the court considered a
takings claim predicated on the theory that the National Trails
,o Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n 20; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 325 n.4 (1987), (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the
other hand, the majority in Keystone agreed with the dissent that the "nuisance exception
to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power itself." 480 U.S. at
491 n. 20.
'0' The owner still, of course, owns the coal, can prevent others from taking it,
and may in the future find productive uses for it employing technological advances
which do not create a nuisance. See note 157, infra.
o See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 86 through 133.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297 n. 40.
- U.S. , I10 S.Ct. 914 (1990).
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System Act Amendments"3 unconstitutionally destroyed state
created reversionary interests in former railroad rights of way
which, under the statute, could be converted to trails. Rather
than addressing the takings issue on its merits, however, the
Court held that because the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
the taking of private property, but merely conditions the exercise
of that power upon an obligation to compensate, the real issue
is whether there exists, at the time of the taking, a "reasonable,




Noting that an "unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker
Act remedy" did not appear from the statute, the Court deter-
mined that petitioner's remedy lay there, rather than in the
proceeding before it."' Thus, while the possibility of having to
pay just compensation may yet have a "chilling effect" on
governmental action," 6 these precedents, at the very least, tend
to enable regulators to enforce severe limitations on mining
without fear of judicial invalidation in a takings challenge.
Intent of SMCRA
SMCRA was enacted to correct the inadequacies of state
laws regulating coal mining by establishing uniform minimum
nationwide standards." 7
"I Pub. L. No. 98-11, 97 Stat. 48 (1983) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1988)),
amending the National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 929 (codified at
16 U.S.C. § 1241)(1988)).
1" Preseault, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct at 921 (citing Regional Rail Reorg. Act
cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.
Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890).
"I Id. at 922. For a discussion of the Tucker Act remedy, see Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
"6 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
Section 102 (30 U.S.C. 1202) states in part:
It is the purpose of this chapter to -
(a) establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations;
(b) assure that the rights of surface landowners and other persons with a
legal interest in the land or appurtenances thereto are fully protected from
such operations;
(c) assure that surface mining operations are not conducted where recla-
mation as required by this Act is not feasible;
(d) Assure that surface coal mining operations are so conducted as to
protect the environment ...
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In the House Report on SMCRA, the impacts of coal mining
on the environment and upon society are painstakenly docu-
mented. "8 That the House believed that surface coal mining and
surface impacts of underground mining was and is a "noxious"
use of the land is clear from its statements that surface mining
operations "involves the temporary or permanent degradation
of vast tracts of land"" 9 and it should constitute a "temporary
use of the land' ' 120 to minimize "the undesirable consequences
of surface mining."'' 21 The House further eliminated this belief
by stating: "the environmental problems associated with under-
ground mining . . . include surface subsidence, surface disposal
of mine wastes, disposal of coal processing wastes, sealing of
portals, entry ways or other mine openings and the control of
acid and other toxic mine drainage.'
' 22
The Senate expressed sentiments that:
[s]urface coal mining activities have imposed large social and
environmental costs on the public at large in many areas of
the country in the form of unreclaimed lands, water pollution,
erosion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife re-
sources, and a decline in natural beauty. Uncontrolled surface
coal mining in many regions has effected a stark, unjustifiable,
and intolerable degradation in the quality of life in local com-
munities.
If surface mining and reclamation are not done carefully,
significant environmental damage can result. In addition, un-
reclaimed or improperly reclaimed surface coal mines pose a
continuing threat to the environment, and at times are a danger
to public health and safety, public or private property. Similar
hazards also occur from the surface effects of underground
coal mining, including the dumping of coal waste piles, sub-
sidence and mine fires.
123
If there is any lingering doubt that the Supreme Court agrees,
one need only read Hodel and the doubt rapidly dispels. The
Hodel decision recites:
"I H.R. RaE No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
ArDm. NEws 593.
" Id. at 73.
'z Id. at 93.
121 Id.
,2 Id. at 126.
123 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1977).
[VOL. 5:585
VER IN SMCRA
Many surface mining operations result in disturbances of sur-
face areas that burden and adversely affect commerce and the
public welfare by destroying or diminishing the utility of land
for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricul-
tural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides,
by contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying
fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by
damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards danger-
ous to life and property, by degrading the quality of life in
local communities, and by counteracting governmental pro-
grams and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural
resources. 124
Justice Marshall in Hodel lists acid drainage, loss of prime
hardwood forest, destruction of wildlife habitat, degrading of
productive farmland, landslides, siltation and sedimentation, re-
duced recreational values, fishkills, reduced waste assimilation
capacity, and impaired water supplies among the adverse impacts
which the Act was designed to cure. The Court quotes House
Report 95-218 that "most widespread damages . . . are environ-
mental in nature." '125 That Congress had plenary power under
the Commerce Clause to regulate a local activity, akin to a
nuisance, the product of which affects interstate commerce seemed
a foregone conclusion to the Justices. 26 "The Act's restrictions
on the practices of mine operators all serve to control the envi-
ronmental and other adverse effects of surface coal mining."'
127
The Court observed that Congress was "concerned about pre-
serving the productive capacity of mined lands and protecting
the public from health and safety hazards that may result from
surface mining. 28 The Court further noted that Congress adopted
the Surface Mining Act in order to ensure that production of
coal for interstate commerce would not be at the expense of
agriculture, the environment or public health and safety, injury
to any of which interests would have deleterious effects on
interstate commerce." 1
29
12 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277 (citing SMCRA § 101(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1976 ed.,
Supp III)).
25 Id. at 280.
126 Id.
,2 Id. at 283.
2 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 327 (1981) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining and Reclamation Assn. Inc., 452 U.S. at 277-280).
,29 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
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As noted, supra, the Keystone Court has reaffirmed that the
prohibition of a "noxious use" first articulated in Mugler v.
Kansas 3 by the exercise of the police power will not constitute
a taking requiring just compensation.13 In Keystone, the Court
upheld the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act which prohibited the
mining of coal in a manner which could cause damage as a
result of subsidence to certain structures'32 on the grounds that
"the public interest in preventing activities similar to public
nuisances is a substantial one .... ,,133
IV. RECONCILING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF VER WITH
MODERN TAKINGS ANALYSIS
The statutory structure and legislative history of Section 522
reveal an intent on the part of Congress to create the strongest
possible protections in the "designations by act of Congress" in
Section 522(e). A comparison of the discretionary designation
requirements in 522(a)(6), which excepted areas where the op-
erator had made "substantial financial and legal commitments,"
with the prohibitions in 522(e) "subject to valid existing rights"
leads ineluctably to the conclusion that Congress intended the
522(e) bans to be all encompassing within the limits of the
Constitution.
Congress was quite explicit that the mere ownership or ac-
quisition costs of the coal itself or the right to mine it did not
warrant protection for an unsuitability designation. 3 4 Congress
was also clear in its judgment that Federal lands should not be
subject to "new surface coal mining operations"' 35 and that the
buffer zones on private lands were necessary for the protection
of the "public health and safety."'' 36 This, in combination with
the various discussions of VER in the legislative history, strongly
suggests that Congress intended that the VER clause be defined
narrowly enough so that the designated lands were not subject
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470.
132 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476 n. 6.
"I Id. at 492 n.22. See also McGinley and Barrett, supra note 104, at 443, (dis-
cussing Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep Cas. (BNA) 1325 (D. Iowa 1980)).
' H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., ist Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
ADM. NEws 593. Only when coupled with "substantial legal and financial commitments"
did such rights obtain any protection under Section 522(a).
"5 S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977).
136 H.R. REp. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977).
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to new mining operations, yet broad enough to prevent a regu-
latory takings challenge. The articulation of that balance has
proved daunting, but it is not insurmountable.
It is impossible to say whether those who first inserted VER
language into legislation a century ago had in mind the issue of
takings in the constitutional sense. The issue, however, certainly
has been in the congressional mind in recent years,137 and a
congressional desire to avoid takings in the application of the
VER-clause of 522(e) of SMCRA is supported, though not con-
clusively demonstrated, in the legislative history.13
The lines of authority interpreting and applying various pre-
SMCRA VER clauses and the "takings" analysis, while seem-
ingly independent of one another, appear to have intersected in
recent years. The common thread which seems to have emerged
is twofold: First, property-irrespective of its source, may be
restricted, conditioned or forfeited in furtherance of legitimate
legislative objectives. 3 9 Thus with United States v. Locke,' 40 the
Supreme Court has dispelled any notion that private rights in
public lands are immune from regulation or even subsequent
forfeiture; with Keystone and Hodel, the Court, similarly, has
shaken the foundations of industry's favorite argument that
Pennsylvania Coal hangs threateningly over the head of any
regulator who might dare to be too zealous in attempting to
prevent injury to the public health and valuable resources.
The second common aspect of these authorities is that they
embrace a notion of fundamental fairness in which the nature
The legislative history of the Wilderness Act, for example, includes the following
discussion in the Technical Amendments to H.R. 9162:
7. Page 11, line 11, insert the words "subject to valid existing rights"
between the words "hereafter" and "all."
The requirement of the bill that all patents issued after the effective
date of this act shall convey title to mineral deposits with a reservation to
the United States of all title to the surface of the lands must be subject to
"valid existing rights." The owner of a valid mining claim perfected under
the mining laws prior to the effective date of this act has already acquired
a possessory title to the surface of the land and any patent issued on such
a claim after the effective date of this act must convey title to both the
land and mineral deposits therein, unless provision is made for just com-
pensation. See Solicitor's Opinion, M-36467 (August 28, 1957).
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS, 3624.
" See, e.g., 123 CONo. REc. 12,878 (1977) (exchange of Mr. Udall and Mr.
Roncalio).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. at 104; Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454
U.S. 781 (1982).
,, 471 U.S. at 104.
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of the government's action plays a vital part. The protection of
VER emerges from a recognition, almost on a visceral level, of
the unfairness of government disavowing its own representations
after it has induced private parties to rely on them.'41 The takings
analysis also focuses on the property owner's reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations 42 in recognition of the inherent un-
fairness of destroying all economically viable use of the
landowner's property. 43 But just as each examines the fairness
to the aggrieved property owner, each also recognizes that it is
not inherently unfair for private expectations to yield to the
greater public good. 44
In this regard it may cogently be argued that the Secretary's
conclusion in 1935 that the public interest in certain tracts was
"too inconsequential to justify the striking down of individual
rights" in applying the savings clause in the Taylor Grazing
Act 45 was a reflection of the same thinking which caused Justice
Holmes to conclude in 1922 that the Kohler Act's effort to
prevent structures from mine subsidence did nothing to advance
the public interest.'46 Changing times aside, the real issue in both
instances is not whether "rights" have been "extingushed" or
can be "protected," but whether it is fundamentally unfair for
society to deny, without just compensation, a particular use of
property in light of the particular private expectations which
government has induced by specific representations and under-
standings.
Such questions, admittedly, would appear to be a regulator's
worst nightmare in a system such as SMCRA which seeks, by
its very existence, to create uniformity in the regulation of sur-
face mining. 147 Upon closer examination, however, this should
not be so. As noted above, Section 522(e) restricts mining on
property falling into two general categories-those affecting pri-
vate lands only and those affecting public lands. With respect
to private lands, the prohibition is extremely narrow, consisting
"'See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 504-
05 (1986).
141 Penn Central Transp. Co. vs. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127-28 (1978).
143 Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
- See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. at 104-106; Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
" See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
', See supra note 91.
,,7 See supra notes 86-133 and accompanying text.
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of "buffer zone" limitations placing distances between surface
mining activity and such protected structures as occupied dwell-
ings, churches, cemeteries and the like. 148 Prohibition of surface
mining and surface effects of underground mining in these areas
survives any possible challenge as a threshold matter because it
seeks to prevent activity similar to a nuisance. 49 Further, a
takings claim based on diminution of value and investment
backed expectations would ordinarily fail because the area de-
leted from mining is so limited. 50
The public lands prohibitions in SMCRA Sections 522(e)(1)-
(3),isi on the other hand, create a greater potential for substantial
conflict with private rights since they can result in the total ban
of substantial mining operations. 15 2 Of course, each claim would
necessarily require a threshold determination of whether the
rights asserted are among those protected by VER in the first
instance - a determination which the Secretary of the Interior,
or Secretary of Agriculture in some instances, is presumptively
I SMCRA §§ 522(e)(4) and (5), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272(e)(4) and (5) (1988).
149 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-92.
150 Further, the availability of waivers and variances eliminate any reasonable pos-
sibility of a taking. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
" 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272(e)(l)-(3) (1988).
52 OSM determined that because the severance deed allowed for deep mining
without protecting subjacent support, the ban on mining and surface impacts from
underground mining in the Monongahela National Forest amounted to a taking under
the 1983 takings regulation then in effect. Otter Creek Coal, 231 Ct. Cl. 879 (1982).
The result is arguably supportable on the theory that the ownership of the coal was
totally appropriated by the government when it was put to use for the public purpose
of providing subjacent support to the National Forest. In Keystone, the Supreme Court
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act, which
prohibited the mining of the coal beneath certain structures in a manner which resulted
in "the caving-in, collapse, or subsidence" of those surface structures "overlying or in
the proximity of the mine." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470. The Supreme Court, rejecting
industry's challenge, held inter alia that the exercise of the police power to prevent
nuisance-like activity (e.g. subsidence) does not require compensation, and that the
public interest served by the Subsidence Act in preventing subsidence damage to struc-
tures, supported the exercise of the police power without compensation.
See also administrative findings by OSM that:
although most of the surface operations and impacts incident to such
underground mining could be constructed or directed so as not to affect
wilderness land, certain surface impacts to the wilderness could not be
avoided, namely subsidence and hydrologic effects" and therefore Otter
Creek's rights were taken. Both of these effects were deemed nuisances
caused by coal mining operation which Congress intended to prevent when
it enacted SMCRA. Thus, there was no taking.
Otter Creek Coal Co., 231 Ct. Cl. 879 (1982).
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and historically well-equipped to make.'5 1 If the mining rights
created by conveyance or acquired under the applicable statute
do not include mining by the method contemplated such as, for
example, strip mining, then under Polino no further inquiry is
necessary since no rights are impaired.
Once a threshold of protectible rights has been proven, an
analysis of the nature of the governmental action and the dim-
inution of value and investment backed expectations may be
considered in determining whether the prohibition operates to
destroy VER, or stated differently, to affect a taking.
In regard to surface mining, the ban on Federal lands is
essentially total, but the nature of the governmental activity
militates againsts a compensable taking. Aside from the specific
legislative findings discussed earlier, perhaps the best description
of the problem appears in the legislative history of the 1976
Mining in the Parks Act, imposing a moratorium on mining in
national parks, which vividly described the threat of modern
mine technology:
Death Valley offers an example of the impact of mineral
activity within these areas. At the time that the monument was
opened to mineral entry, it was recognized that a significant
aspect of the history of this area was the role of the prospector.
By leaving the monument open to the Mining Law of 1872, it
was anticipated that the picturesque figure of the prospector
and his burro would continue to be a part of the scene.
But evolving mining technology has altered this situation rad-
ically. In recent years, major surface mining operations using
massive earthmoving equipment have begun within the monu-
ment. Where once the impact of mineral exploration and de-
velopment was hardly noticeable, the very character of Death
Valley is now threatened with serious alteration.
54
In regard to deep mining, mining per se is not prohibited,
only the surface impacts are prohibited.' Thus this situation
would appear to be controlled by Keystone. In Keystone, the
"I See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963).
,s4 H.R. REP. No. 1428, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
ANDi ArDsmN. NEws 2487.
"I Surface impacts are permissible upon a finding by the Secretary that there are
no significant recreational, timber, economic or other values which may be incompatible
or the lands west of the 100th meridian do not have significant forest cover. SMCRA §
522(e)(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2) (1988).
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Court held that the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act withstands an
attack on diminution of value and investment backed expectation
grounds because the whole parcel was not affected by the ban
on mining and there was no showing that the owners were denied
the economically viable use of their property. 156 No taking occurs
since not all economically viable use of the land has been de-
stroyed.' 7 The coal may still be mined provided surface impacts
are prevented. Thus 522(e) does not prohibit the activity but
only the manner in which it may be conducted. Since one cannot
acquire the right to exploit property and foist off the attendant
harms upon the public, 5 8 no legitimate expectation is defeated.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that courts remain sensitive
to the concern that government not overstep its bounds by
physically appropriating desireable property under the guise of
regulation. 5 9 Concerns about Section 522(e) takings are further
minimized by the fact that Sections 522(e)(2) and (3) contain
provisions which effectively limit the prohibitions to circum-
stances where it is administratively determined that there is a
true threat to the values which these provisions seek to pre-
serve. 160 Since government can eliminate these threats without
116 480 U.S. at 485.
'17 Coal may not necessarily be a single use property. It may be mined for its
methane gas or subjected to in-situ processing.
"I' McGinley and Barrett, supra note 104 at 441. See also, McFerrin and Whitman,
Valid Existing Rights and the Constitution: 1983 Regulatory Changes, 87 W. VA. L.
REV. 647 (1984-85). The authors state:
Thus, very few mining companies would have valid existing rights under a
"reasonable investment-backed expectation." They could not expect to
impose their externalities with impunity. The distance and location limita-
tions of the Act are designed to ensure that the effects of the mining are
confined to the mine site. Since one's ownership and use of property is
always limited by potential harm to others, one could reasonably expect
limits such as the Act imposes and could rarely have the expectations
needed to support a finding of valid existing rights." (citations omitted).
"I The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825 (1987), which held that the Coastal Commission could not, without paying
compensation, condition a rebuilding permit upon the requirement that the owner allow
the public to pass across his beachfront property, reveals a judicial antipathy to regu-
latory conduct which is perceived as a thinly disguised physical acquisition of property
for public use and enjoyment. See generally, McGinley and Barrett, supra note 104, at
447-48.
1w SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2) (1988) provides "That surface coal
mining operations may be permitted on such (national forest] lands if the Secretary finds
that there are no significant recreational, timber, economic, or other uses which may be
incompatable with such surface mining operations..." SMCRA § 522(e)(3), 30 U.S.C.
1272(e)(3) (1988) does not prohibit mining which will adversely affect a public park or
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compensation, the issue, if at all, exists in the broader prohibi-
tion of Section 522(e)(1).
V. A PROPOSED REGULATORY APPROACH
Consideration of the Statute of Limitations
Since claims against the United States for regulatory takings
must be brought within six years of when the cause of action
occurs,' 61 there is a serious question of the continued vitality of
takings claims under SMCRA if the accrual of the claim occurred
on August 3, 1977, when SMCRA became law. One might
construe the Section 522(e) VER clause as the predicate act which
triggered running of the clock on SMCRA claims. 162 While au-
thority for the proposition that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until administrative action is taken recognizing
a protectible coal interest and subsequently denying the owner
the right to mine the coal, 163 the more compelling argument is
that the holder of the claim should not be the master of its
maturity since that renders the statute of limitations ineffective
registered historic site if there is joint approval by the regulatory authority and the
Federal, State, or local agency with jurisdiction over the park or historic site.
.61 See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1976) which states:
Time for filing suit:
Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be
barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim
first accrues.
See also, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976), which states:
Time for commencing action against United States
(a) Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be
barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action
first accrues. The action of any person under legal disability or beyond the
seas at the time the claim accrues may be commenced within three years
after the disability ceases.
162 See, e.g., Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 746 F.2d 570,
(C.A. Ak 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 68, which found that the date of enactment of
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was the operative date which began the running
of the statute of limitations for purposes of a takings claim.
"I' See Meridian Land & Mineral Company v. Hodel, 843 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1988)
(the issue of taking the claimant's coal rights by the ban on mining in the Custer
National Forest was ripe without first requiring the coal owner to apply for a surface
mining permit or seeking an agency determination that he possessed "valid existing
rights.") In Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. Hodel, No. C-2-88-0416 slip op. (S.D. Ohio,
June 2, 1988), District Judge Graham found that the denial by OSMRE that Sunday
Creek Coal Co. had VER did not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before
a takings claim in District Court could be filed.
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and frustrates its underlying purpose of finality. 1"4 Holders of
VER should not be encouraged, indeed, required to sit on their
rights awaiting the election of a favorable administration or
other events perceived by them to be favorable before presenting
their takings claims; rather, they should be encouraged to present
their claims as soon as possible after a takings by legislative or
regulatory action occurs so that certainty in the management of
public lands is served. The recent decision in Preseault makes
an action in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act the exclusive
remedy to determine if a compensable taking has occurred.
Nothing in SMCRA implies that Congress intended to withdraw
the Tucker Act remedy. Indeed one may posit that the VER
clause implicitly recognizes that valid existing rights are afforded
protection and one vehicle by which such protection is invoked
is a takings claim under the Tucker Act. 65 Further discussion of
this topic is beyond the scope of this article.
Substantive Regulatory Approach
The purpose of the foregoing analysis has been to examine
the possible sources of guidance from the legislative history,
historical precedents, and constitutional principles which inform
the concept of valid existing rights and how they may be pro-
tected. It is, obviously, up to the regulators to formulate an
approach to VER which is reasonable and consistent with the
statutory language and legislative objectives of SMCRA. This
review, we beleive, supports the following approach: First, al-
though the phrase "subject to valid existing rights" applies to
the entirety of Section 522(e), its historical usage is limited to
the public lands. Subsections (e)(l) through (3) are potential
sources of future VER issues under the analysis that has emerged
in this discussion of VER, but the most likely source of future
conflict exists with respect to the public lands and resources
identified in Section 522(e)(1). We believe that the traditional
role of the Secretary in determining the existence of VER should
be maintained. Although the Act shows an intent to protect
VER in the implementation of these prohibitions, modern tak-
I6 See Whitney Benefits v. U.S., 18 CI.Ct. 394 (1989). (recognizing the SMCRA
enactment date as the date of the taking).
165 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 914
(1990).
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ings jurisprudence and the recognized subjugation of all property
rights, including the special category of less-than-fee interests in
publicly held lands historically recognized as VER, to the health
and safety of the public and the preservation of its values militate
against the finding of takings under SMCRA. The 522(e)(4) and
(5) "buffer zone" limitations are virtually immune from takings
challenges under these precedents. While some question may
linger under the federal public lands provisions discussed above,
we feel that the agency would be justified in adopting either an
approach which permits case by case consideration of takings
claims in these areas or simply denies all such claims, preserving
the right to just compensation through the Tucker Act if such
is available.
In any event, the issue should be reserved to Interior, rather
than the applicable state regulatory authority, because of its
plenary jurisdiction over public lands and, more importantly,
because the potential for inconsistent findings on the part of
competing state regulatory authorities is contrary to the statutory
goal of uniformity and may encourage a "race to the bottom".
CONCLUSION
The transplantation of statutory VER language from its tra-
ditional soil in the area of public land to the muddy area of
land-use regulation in SMCRA has caused difficulties that Con-
gress surely did not fully intend when it introduced the language
in the Ninety-Third Congress and passed it into law two years
later. Evolving notions of property and the police power, how-
ever, reveal that the issues presented by Congress' arguably
unfortunate choice of words are perhaps illusory. Under SMCRA
and the law as articulated by the Supreme Court, Congress can
do what it set out to do: eliminate the destructive effects of
surface and underground mining on our most treasured values.
Therefore, we believe that a future proposed rule promulgation
should:
A. Recognize the presumptive validity of all "buffer zone"
prohibitions against takings challenges;
B. Establish standards necessary to recognize and protect
existing entitlements in the form of permits existing at the time
of passage and applications which, but for the passage of the
Act, met all statutory requirements for permitting the opera-
tion at the time of passage; and
C. Establish standards to determine which pre-SMCRA
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activities on publicly owned lands are entitled to protection
under traditional VER analysis (e.g., performance of necessary
tasks to create and maintain the claim), and evaluate on a
case-by-case basis whether operation of the prohibition will
effectively extinguish all rights previously obtained from the
sovereign.

